Philosophical Dictionary

Discover how your language might be shaping—or limiting—your thoughts. Explore Wittgenstein's revolutionary "language games" concept and the truth behind the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Learn why linguists believe the words we use influence but don't determine our perception of reality.

Join us as we explore Descartes's philosophical revolution which is listed amongst the likes of Newton and Copernicus. Descartes, a Rationalist, sought to rebuild knowledge on the foundation of reason alone, famously using his method of Cartesian Doubt to discard uncertain beliefs making him an extremist Socratic reincarnation. We delve into his Meditations 6, particularly his exploration of the mind-body problem, where he argued for the distinct, yet interacting, substances of mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa). We also look at criticisms of Descartes’ Dualism by figures like Princess Elizabeth and Gilbert Ryle, who mockingly called it the “Dogma of the Ghost in the Machine.” 

Camus ends a book about suicide with a man pushing a rock forever and calls him happy. The line is an instruction to the reader, not a report on Sisyphus’s mood, and it closes a real argument about the absurd. Two philosophers later pushed back hard. Were they right, or is Sisyphus just asymptomatic?

Kant proposed that our perception of the world is shaped by our senses and mental faculties, filtering reality into a comprehensible form. The "Thing-in-Itself," however, represents the elusive reality that lies beyond our perceptual limitations. By grasping this concept, you can challenge the boundaries of your own understanding and explore what lies beneath the surface of appearances.

Nietzsche’s Übermensch is quoted everywhere, from gyms to tech conferences, yet he wrote surprisingly little about it, and complained that readers took it for a half-saint, half-genius or the next stage of evolution. What does the overman in Thus Spoke Zarathustra actually stand for, and who is the last man the crowd prefers?

Most philosophical problems, Wittgenstein thought, are knots in our language, not puzzles about the world. We explain linguistic confusion, language games, meaning is use and the beetle in a box, from the Tractatus to the Investigations, and ask what his critics asked: is calling a problem confusion a clever dodge?